Thomas Kuhn

Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions

p.g. 192 (Postscript)
"When I speak of knowledge embedded in shared exemplars, I am not referring to a mode of knowing that is less systematic or less analyzable than knowledge embedded in rules, laws, or criteria of identification. Instead I have in mind a manner of knowing which is misconstrued if reconstructed in terms of rules that are first abstracted from exemplars and thereafter function in their stead."

Wittgenstein's games

"Consider for example the proceedings that we call `games'. I mean board games, card games, ball games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all? Don't say, "There must be something common, or they would not be called `games' " - but look and see whether there is anything common to all. For if you look at them you will not see something common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don't think, but look! Look for example at board games, with their multifarious relationships.

The site is expanding

The format is changing from a narrow focus on parsing to a broader consideration of language and meaning, and the relationship of both to complexity theory.

Check back often. There will be links to relevant work in the fields of cognition, mathematics, artificial intelligence, the theory of computation, ontology, and philosophy.